A summary of past safety troubles and measures
Fatal or serious injury of an person as a result of the operation of an aircraft, or an aircraft crash, collision or fire, as classified by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT).
On February 10, 2011, JAL074 (Narita to Honolulu) rocked violently due to a sudden change in winds during approach to Honolulu Airport, causing injuries to 5 passengers (including fractured left leg of one passenger). 2 cabin attendant was also injured. On the same day, MLIT classified this case as an aircraft accident. The investigation was taken over from Japan Transport Safety Board to U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) since it turned out by the investigation after the accident that this occurred in US air space.
On March 20, 2012, the U.S. NTSB disclosed the probable cause of this accident, that is;
A descending airplane encountered the turbulence caused by strong windshear. At the time, windshear was caused by wave-like disturbance which existed west of where the accident occurred. Turbulence was not predicted by weather forecasters.
*Windshear: a weather condition in which wind velocity and direction change heavily in horizontal or vertical direction
An incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident, such as overrunning, emergency evacuation, fire or smoke inside the cabin and abnormal depressurization, encountering abnormal weather conditions, etc, as classified by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT).
On August 15, 2010, during climb of JAL3538 (Sendai Airport to Fukuoka Airport) from Sendai Airport, the Fire Alarm of the Right Engine was activated. The flight crew stopped the Engine and used fire extinguishant. They confirmed the fire was extinguished, and declared an emergency to air traffic control, and the aircraft returned to Sendai Airport. As a result of inspection, traces of fire on the engine exterior and interior were recognized. As this corresponded to "fire or smoke inside the aircraft and fire in the engine fire-prevention area" under Civil Aeronautics Law Enforcement Regulations, MLIT classified this incident as a Serious Incident on August 15. None of the passengers or crew was injured.
Investigations were conducted by Japan Transport Safety Board, and the results were announced on June 29, 2012. According to their report, it is assumed that engine oil leaked from a rupture in the oil scavenge tube of the right engine bearing rotating shaft, contacted high-temperature sections inside the engine and resulted in fire. The rupture is assumed to be a crack which extended into a hole due to metal fatigue caused by continual stress imposed on the oil scavenge tube in engine operation.
JTSB advised the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to urge the engine manufacturer to change the oil scavenge tube design and improve the inspection method at disassembling the engine.
As metal fatigue and rupture were caused by unreasonable weight imposed on the oil scavenge tube due to misalignment in the connecting area of the ruptured oil scavenge tubes and other tubes, the engine repair and assembly manual was revised, a procedure for checking misalignment when connecting the oil scavenge tube was added, and the procedure for connecting tubes was changed.
On December 26, 2010 at Fukuoka Airport, Air Busan Flight 141 was instructed by the air traffic controller (ATC) to hold short of runway. However, the pilot ran over the stop line and taxied onto the runway. As a result, JAL3530 (from Sendai to Fukuoka), which was making its final approach, was instructed by the ATC to perform Go Around. None of the passengers and crews were injured. MLIT classified this case as a Serious Incident and JAL3530 was treated as the aircraft involved.
Investigations were conducted by Japan Transport Safety Board, and the results were announced on August 31, 2012. According to their report, this incident had been caused by the flight crew of the Air Busan(ABL), who misheard instructions from the air traffic controller, and the air traffic controller, who did not check read-back from the ABL aircraft